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Abstract  
The Dutch police system has been under pressure during the last decades. 
Critical debates focused on police’ dealing with the growing (perceived) 
insecurity, the administrative problems of size and efficiency, the core tasks 
of the police, the distribution of power over the police and it’s accountabil-
ity. These issues have become even more relevant since integrated local 
safety policies have been developed to tackle public safety problems by the 
police together with more and different partners, within government or even 
outside of it. At the same time the national government wants to direct its 
local and regional partners more, while holding on to local performance. 
The aim of this article is to show the developments of the last decades that 
have influenced the (re)organization of the police and the way they are 
steered and democratically controlled. Police forces are now closely cooper-
ating with other actors in rather complex safety networks, steered by local 
government and concentrating on their core tasks, leaving more tasks to 
other actors than in the past. Finding sensible balances between centrally 
organized tasks and variants of steering (direction), and more local organi-
zation and steering (discretion) will be crucial for the future of the public 
police. 
1 Introduction 
Since the Second World War the Dutch police system has been 
the subject of many debates, finally resulting in a new Police Act 
in 1993. However, the debate did not stop and has even intensi-
fied since 2005. The debates on how to organize, steer and con-
trol the police had technical, political and administrative dimen-
sions. Elements of (perceived) insecurity have created a growing 
and maybe sometimes unreasonable pressure on police perform-
ance the last couple of years (Boutellier 2002, Terpstra and Van 
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der Vijver 2006). The managerial/administrative problems of size 
and efficiency together with the rising public demand on per-
formance made the government, politicians and the police search 
for answers, one of them being police reform. The Dutch police 
reform has been a constant and precarious balancing of power 
and authority; a balance between the distribution of power and 
authority within and around the police, between actors, or from 
one actor to another. What autonomy is to be given to partners, 
what freedom and control is required in decision-making, what 
level of discretion do partners get in decisions and more impor-
tantly in actions, who is responsible or can be hold accountable? 
These questions have become even more relevant the last decade, 
due to integrated local safety policies having been developed in 
which several different elements of safety issues are tackled by 
more and different partners. The police reform is about give and 
take, it is about empowerment and disempowerment (Savage 
2007), or in other terms it is about direction and discretion. Gov-
ernment has “a special role within society to regulate actions of 
public interest” (Schnabel 2001: 17). She directs partners what 
(safety) issues to tackle and how, i.e. she sets the course how to 
reach desired social outcomes. Governments cannot handle eve-
rything themselves and they have to rely upon other actors, sec-
tors and other governmental layers, and these should be involved 
in the policy formation and/or implementation (e.g. network 
management). By defining regulations the government can pro-
vide elbowroom – also policy freedom – to partners, or she can 
put limitations to their freedom. This discretion can be necessary 
for proper policy execution. All in all, discretion has to do with 
‘how’ the government goes about her business.  
The debates about the reform have been about the national 
government wanting to direct its local and regional partners 
more, while at the same time holding on to local performance. 
This leads us to our research question: What developments have 
taken place the last decades in the Dutch police systems with re-
gard to the organization of the police and the way the police are 
steered and democratically controlled within a continuously 
evolving social and political context, and what assessment can be 
made of the centralizing and decentralizing tendencies within the 
system? 
To be able to answer this research question we will describe 
the current police system in The Netherlands in section two, and 
Police reform in The Netherlands 93 
in the third section we will put the police reform in a historical 
perspective to show the successive waves of reform.  
As mentioned before the debate about police reform has inten-
sified again in 2005. We will describe in section four what this 
reform discussion is about, and what the implications are of this 
recent police reform discussion. Direction and discretion can be 
substitutes in some respects but also complementary in other re-
spects. Central and local steering for instance do not necessarily 
have to collide. They can also strengthen each other. We will use 
(elements of) direction and discretion to be able to assess the 
Dutch police reform in section five. In the last section some con-
cluding remarks follow. 
2 The current police system in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands are a parliamentary democracy with a separation 
of powers between the legislature (parliament), the executive 
(government) and the judiciary (the courts). These powers are 
formally independent. The police, who have a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force, are a branch of the executive that must 
operate within the law. The current police system is based on the 
1993 Police Act, which is the successor of the 1957 Police Act. 
The core of the 1993 Police Act is the up scaling from 148 mu-
nicipal police forces and 17 districts of the national police into 25 
police regions and one national support force, i.e. the National 
Police Services Agency (KLPD), which has several national 
tasks like Water police and highway surveillance, also serves as a 
coordinator and facilitator for the regional police. This organiza-
tional format has been operational since 1994. The size of the 
total police force grew from around 40,000 fulltime-equivalents 
(fte) to 53,500 fte in 2006. The regional forces vary in size, based 
on factors such as population size, crime levels and building den-
sity. The largest police force has close to ten times as many ftes 
compared to the smallest, which has 550 fte. This is a big differ-
ence to the former municipal forces which sometimes consisted 
of just 40 fte.  
The core task of the police hasn’t changed much from the old 
police act. ‘The police have the task, subordinate to the compe-
tent authority and in accordance with the applicable rules of law, 
of ensuring effective law enforcement and rendering assistance to 
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those who need it’ (art. 2, Police Act 1993). Included in this de-
scription of police work are the maintenance of public order, the 
enforcement of the legal order through the criminal law and the 
performance of policing duties for the justice authorities (Police 
department 2004: 9). 
Most regional forces are subdivided in a number of districts 
(territorial) and divisions (functional). A large part of the police 
officers work in basic units, i.e. neighborhood teams, because 
they have to act in very close vicinity of the general public. To 
enhance their relationships with the public the police base their 
approach on community policing. A basic unit operates from one 
or more police stations and its duties consist of many territorially 
bound activities, like daily patrols, mediating in disputes, and 
keeping in touch with the public and with businesses and institu-
tions, neighborhood associations and other interest groups. Func-
tional units are specialized in different aspects of policing, some 
of them operating on an inter-regional basis (Police department 
2004: 16). Examples of specialized units are emergency services, 
arrest teams, police infiltration teams, and criminal investigation 
support teams. 
The Netherlands have three governmental layers: at the na-
tional, provincial and municipal level, with no defined hierarchi-
cal relation. The Netherlands are a decentralized unitary state, 
which means that actions are organized based on the principle of 
‘decentralized, unless …’. The current regional police system is 
also basically a decentralized system.  
Governance of the police 
Within the Dutch decentralized unitary state the need for protec-
tion by the police has always been accompanied by the need for 
protection against the police, i.e. against a strong and powerful 
central police force. Therefore, checks and balances traditionally 
characterize arrangements for steering and control of the Dutch 
police. No single body should have sole authority over the police 
(Van Sluis and Cachet 2007: 107). The authority is shared be-
tween the ministers of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (from 
now on called Interior) and of Justice on the one hand and mu-
nicipal authorities on the other hand (Police department 2004: 
10). At the municipal level, the mayor holds authority over and is 
responsible for the maintenance of public order or the rendering 
of assistance. Where the police are enforcing the criminal law or 
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carrying out duties for the justice authorities, they act under the 
authority of the public prosecutor (art. 13, Police Act 1993). In 
carrying out these duties, the public prosecutors are supervised 
by the Board of Procurators General. The Minister of Justice is 
politically accountable for the work of the public prosecutor and 
the procurators general (Police department 2004: 10). 
The minister of Interior together with the minister of Justice 
formulates the General Police Policy for a period of four years. 
Every two years Interior provides provisional information about 
the funding for each police force. The forces then decide inter-
nally how this budget will be spent (Police department 2004: 13). 
The force manager (see below), the chief public prosecutor and 
all the mayors in a region make up the executive board of the po-
lice force and take the formal policy decisions for the regional 
level. The policy is formulated taking into consideration the 
wishes of the municipalities, the police force and the national 
government. The regional council then determines the policy. In 
the regional tripartite consultation the force manager, together 
with the chief of police and the public prosecutor, make a de-
tailed plan of operations within this policy framework. 
According to chapter VIII of the 1993 Police Act the Minister 
of Interior distributes the police budget (art. 44), but he can also 
decide which rules regional forces have to follow (art. 45), or fa-
cilitate cooperation between regional forces (art. 46). In other 
words, the general management of the police forces is national. 
The ministry of Interior is also responsible for the management 
of the National Police Services Agency. The operational man-
agement of the 25 police forces is mainly determined regionally, 
with their own discretion in the exercise of their duties (Police 
department 2004: 10). The regional executive board does the 
administration, which encompasses the ‘decisions about the or-
ganization, staffing, budget, annual accounts and the regional 
policy plan’ (Beheer Beheerst 2005: 16). 
The management and administration of the police has been 
delegated to the force manager, which most of the times is the 
mayor of the largest municipality in the police region. As such he 
liaises with the minister of Interior.  
The chief of police, who has been mandated by the force man-
ager, supports the police force manager and his main task is the 
daily management of the police force. The mayor, the local chief 
of police and the public prosecutor, make up the local tripartite 
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consultation, in which the implementation of the police tasks is 
decided.  
The 25 force managers and the manager of the National Police 
Services Agency form the Board of Regional Police Force Man-
agers. The Board has no formal status and is not mentioned in the 
1993 Police act, but they do meet every six weeks where they 
make influential decisions.  In their meetings they do discuss is-
sues like level and amount of organized crime or the more gen-
eral problems of police force strength. They also regularly meet 
the Council of Police Chiefs that consists of the 25 regional po-
lice chiefs and the chief of the National Police Service Agency. 
This Council, that started on January 1, 1994, also has no official 
status. The Council supports the Board, and it functions as an ad-
visor to the ministry of Interior for the police policy. 
Dualisms 
The Dutch police can be characterized by two dualisms: that be-
tween authority and management and that between administrative 
and judicial authority. According to the 1993 Police Act author-
ity precedes management. That is, the police force managers 
have to adjust their management decisions to the wishes of the 
regional authorities (i.e. all mayors and the chief public prosecu-
tors for each region) and the wishes of the national police policy 
makers (i.e. the ministers). In practice, authority and manage-
ment decisions are interconnected. The chief public prosecutor, 
for instance, holds co-authority over the regional police force and 
at the same time is part of the regional council and in this posi-
tion is surrounded by all the mayors. 
Recently local public safety policies have been developed as 
alternatives to local steering of the police (Cachet, Van Sluis et 
al. 2009). The Police Act has been adjusted so that the policy 
planning cycle starts at the local level. That is, it starts with the 
wishes of the municipal council. There are no guarantees that 
these wishes are realized, however. Mayors hold the authority 
over the police and are responsible for the maintenance of public 
order or the rendering of assistance in their municipality.  At the 
same time, the police ministers are making more police policy 
decisions. The mayor of a municipality is held accountable by the 
municipal council for the maintenance of the public order, but 
not for the functioning of the police force in every respect. This 
creates a democratic gap (Huberts, et al. 2004). 
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3 Reform of the police in historical perspective 
History of the debate, till 1989 
After the Second World War the police system functioned in a 
stable and relatively quiet country. For a very long time Dutch 
police almost had been invisible. In a stable society where socie-
tal order was seldom contested and crime rates were very low, 
the police only acted as a medium of last resort, and full en-
forcement was still possible then. The police did what was neces-
sary to enforce the law and to maintain order. Social order was 
based on a broad consensus, even though society was divided in 
distinct ‘pillars’ (Lijphart, 1966). This changed rather fast during 
the second half of the nineteen sixties. What the police did or did 
not, and how the police did what they did became the subject of 
fierce political debate. Societal unrest and fast rising crime rates 
made full enforcement absolutely impossible. Political decisions 
about police work became inevitable (Reiner, 1985; Van Sluis en 
Cachet, 2007). The police was one of the first to be confronted 
with new trends and problems in society. As a frontline organiza-
tion the police became much more visible and vulnerable for 
criticism. It led to broad and sometimes fierce debates about ef-
fectiveness and legitimacy of the Dutch police. The police, espe-
cially the police system, were put high on the societal and politi-
cal agendas. Hence, it led to increasing pressures to reform the 
police. Pressures that finally resulted in the police reform of the 
early nineteen nineties. 
For the government in general, but for the police in particular, 
large scale social disorder and quickly rising crime rates were 
new challenges. Nevertheless many attempts to change the 1957 
Police Act failed. Since the 1957 Police Act the police system in 
the Netherlands consisted of state and municipal police forces. 
The municipal police served municipalities of at least 25.000 
citizens, later on upgraded to 40.000 citizens in 1968. In smaller 
municipalities the police tasks were performed by the national 
police force. Between 1945 and 1990 the debate about the police 
system was about the system itself, but even more so about pa-
rameters within the system. The discussion was about the size 
and strength of the forces and about the division between state 
and municipal police. Bottom-line of the debate was that the po-
lice efficiency had to improve. The efficiency did not improve, 
because of different interests; especially since (conflicting) inter-
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ests of the different local authorities (the mayors) over the police 
had to be taken into account. In 1977 a government initiated re-
port called The Changing Police appeared which for the first time 
spoke about a social and involved police (Cachet et al. 1998).  
Emergence of the 1993 Police Act 
During the early eighties the police reform debate was reintro-
duced and intensified, because the coalition partners had put the 
reform high on their political agenda during the formation of the 
Lubbers III coalition in 1989. After an unorganized start the two 
ministers, i.e. of Interior and Justice, worked in harmony on the 
police system reform. Problems of disorder and rising crime rates 
were one reason to start the debate about police reform. The last 
decades of the twentieth century crime rates have risen to tenfold 
now compared to 1960. The professionalization and internation-
alization of crime and its visibility were also important factors 
(Wittebrood and Nieuwbeerta 2006). It had also become clear 
that the police could not do everything by themselves (Cachet 
1990). At the same time, all parts of government, and thus the 
police as well, were put under pressure to start being more effi-
cient and effective, since the public finances were growing out of 
control. Many societal developments were putting extra pressure 
on police performance: increasing mobility, decreasing social 
cohesion, internationalization, major increases in information and 
communication technology and exchange, and new forms of in-
security (Castells 1996). It became clear that politics had to set 
priorities and policy for the police (Van Sluis and Cachet 2007).  
The reform debate was mainly about scale: the police system 
was inefficient, too small, incapable of coordinating, and not able 
to cope with (the expansion of) (inter)national and organized 
crime (Cachet, Van Sluis et al. 2009). A larger scale and better 
administration were the key words to enhance effectiveness and 
efficiency. Recurring theme in the debate was that this size and 
scale discussion should not lead to a larger distance between citi-
zens and the police. The basic police care must be up to standard 
and the democratic control in order. 
The whole reorganization of the police was a unique operation, 
because firstly it was the police that was reorganized, secondly it 
was a major and successful reorganization – unusual within 
Dutch public administration –  and thirdly it happened within one 
cabinet’s period of four years. The new police system coincided 
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with the emergence of policy planning as an instrument for steer-
ing and control of the police and with an increase in management 
information systems (Van Sluis and Cachet 2007: 108). Gradu-
ally, the ministry of Interior has become more dominant in the 
Dutch police system by using rather new instruments like policy 
planning and performance-based steering (Van Sluis and Van 
Thiel 2003). 
First impressions, investigations and analyses during 1994-1998 
After the initial hurdles and organizational problems of the reor-
ganization the first impressions and indications of the functioning 
of the new police system started to show. The pros and cons of 
the new system came to the fore. The new police system has been 
investigated and analyzed quite intensively during the first cou-
ple of years after the reorganization. Besides many other re-
searches the two major research reports about the 1993 Police 
Act were the ‘in-depth research’ of a university police research 
consortium (1998) and a ‘broadly-based research’ by the Institute 
for applied social sciences (ITS 1998). These investigations and 
analyses mainly focused on two elements. On the one hand the 
operational and administrative strength, i.e. the effectiveness, ef-
ficiency and quality of the organization and the execution of the 
police tasks, and on the other hand the administrative steering 
and democratic control. The relationship between these two had 
not always had a clear demarcation, which created two sided de-
bates. On the one hand the debates had been about the perform-
ance (output) and the real effect (outcome) of the police system 
and police functioning, while on the other hand the discussions 
involved the (pre)conditions for the police functioning (input). 
The 1993 Police Acts did not function properly when informal 
and personal relations in and around the police force were dis-
turbed. Connections between administration, the judiciary and 
the police proved to be heavily dependent on personal relations. 
Hence the questions who should hold authority over the police 
and is responsible and who should have administrative powers 
(re)appeared in all of the debates. This resulted in arguments pro 
centralization to enhance the performance, but the same line of 
reasoning would be applied in favor of decentralization. In other 
words, the debate about the police system continued.  
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The police system in balance: 1998-2002 
In 1999 the ministry of Interior and of Justice presented their re-
action to the ongoing debate about the police system in a report 
entitled ‘The police system in balance’ (Bestel in Balans). Sev-
eral propositions for changes in the Police Act were made, but 
none really have been implemented since several of the proposed 
changes were already informally in motion. Most propositions 
were about the administration of the force and the democratic 
accountability of the police system. Measures about the output or 
outcome of police activities were not present in the report. The 
most important proposed change was that the force manager was 
now to be accountable to the minister of Interior. This minister 
also got the power to give directions in implementing national 
police issues to the force manager. This created a new debate be-
cause now the minister was able to steer through the administra-
tive line, which makes the division between authority and ad-
ministration more unclear. Also the information model that com-
pares between the different forces was introduced in the report.  
Another very relevant proposed change (Bestel in Balans 
1999: 21-23) was that in 2000 a national policy cycle for the po-
lice would be introduced which states that regional priorities 
from now on had to be compatible with national priorities in the 
‘Policy plan for the Dutch Police’ (Beleidsplan Nederlandse Poli-
tie 1998). This was a significant break with former policy (Van 
Sluis and Cachet 2007: 108). 
The call for further reform: 2002-2005 
During the next years several minor and a couple of larger 
changes were introduced. In 2002 a fierce election campaign by 
Pim Fortuyn, who was murdered just before the elections in June, 
made safety a central theme on the agenda of every political 
party. In October of that year the Balkenende I cabinet presented 
their first Safety program (BZK 2002) right before the coalition 
broke up. This Safety program changes the focus from the police 
as primary actor in tackling (local) safety issues to working to-
gether with different organizations and partners in both the public 
and private domains. One of the aims is to put the responsibility 
of tackling certain safety issues at the ‘rightful’ owner, which 
may be the police but can also be another partner. 
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To counter the problems and advise the Balkenende II coali-
tion about the effectiveness, efficiency, flexibility and transpar-
ency of the current police system a state committee (Leemhuis-
Stout 2004) was instated. One of its main proposals was to hand 
over the administration of the regional forces and the National 
Police Services Agency exclusively to the ministers of Interior 
and of Justice. The mayor still holds the authority over the police, 
however. The National Police Services Agency had already come 
completely under administration of the ministry of Interior (Das, 
et al. 2007: 523). Also a first attempt was made to introduce legal 
provisions to make the regional police forces cooperate better. In 
response to this the regional forces initiated the service for coop-
eration of the Dutch Police (voorziening tot samenwerking Poli-
tie Nederland or vtsPN) in 2005. However, the governing coali-
tion wanted more control and possibilities to steer and thus intro-
duced an amendment to the Police Act in which a legal basis was 
formed to give the national government, i.e. Interior, more in-
struments to be able to steer the administration and the police 
performance so national priorities could be better safeguarded 
(Bruggeman 2005). This of course led to much debate because 
the principle ‘decentralized, unless…’ could not be upheld in this 
format. Also the National Criminal Investigation Services (Na-
tionale Recherche) was formed as a new method of fighting seri-
ous and organized crime in 2003. 
Intensification of the debate: 2005-2008 
The aforementioned Leemhuis committee presented their report 
‘Locally rooted, nationally strengthened’ (Lokaal verankerd, na-
tionaal versterkt) in which they reemphasized problems like de-
mocratic accountability and police effectiveness, but also made 
clear that a top-down policy approach holds the danger of na-
tional priorities superseding local priorities (Stuurgroep Evaluatie 
Politieorganisatie 2005). The committee proposed changes of the 
1993 Police Act and wanted to introduce the idea of the Dutch 
Police as one concern. In this concern model the mayor and pub-
lic prosecutor still hold authority over the police and the munici-
pal council should have a strengthened position. This was done 
by the so-called fetch duty (‘haalplicht’) of the regional police 
authority, which means that the priorities of the municipal coun-
cil must be fetched and introduced at the beginning of the police 
policy planning cycle.  
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Most important recommendation is that the police concern 
should exist out of a board, that manages the police as a national 
concern, the regional forces and the National Police Service 
Agency and in which the chiefs of police are the daily manager 
of the police forces (Stuurgroep Evaluatie Politieorganisatie 
2005: 165-168). This way the Dutch police will have their roots 
locally, but will be strengthened nationally. 
4 The most recent reform debate: Police Act 200X 
The proposal of the new Police Act 
The Leemhuis committee report led to another broad and intense 
debate about the future of the Dutch police system. The ongoing 
debate about the police system became more widespread and 
more and more parties – like the taskforce IBO, the Association 
of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG 2005), and the Dutch Soci-
ety, Security and Police Foundation (SMVP 2005) – joined in 
with their own visions on how the police should be organized. In 
search for an answer to all these positions, the Balkenende II coa-
lition proposed a change of the 1993 Police Act. 
The concept for the new Police Act (2006; later on referred to 
as Police Act 200X) was introduced on November 23, 2005. The 
coalition agreed with the bottle-necks mentioned by the Leem-
huis committee. She further stated that a ‘roof’ was missing on 
the current police system. That is, national priorities had difficul-
ties getting visible in the rather autonomous police regions. Be-
cause of the dominant position of the force managers, the author-
ity of the regional executive board had weakened. Also the dif-
ferent roles and positions of the force managers – being force 
manager as well as mayor of the central city in the region – were 
a problem. The municipal councils had only a marginal role in 
the formulation of the regional police policy and last but not least 
there was the democratic gap, the accountability deficit inherent 
in the regional organization of the police. Other bottle-necks 
were that police forces did not cooperate enough, the lack of a 
proper information structure and exchange, no transparency in 
the administrative and bureaucratic numbers, and weak strategic 
flexibility of the police. Tackling all these problems required a 
police organization that at all levels, from local to international, 
has both authority and administration properly embedded. This 
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requires a greater unity of the police system (BZK & Justitie 
2006). 
Proposed changes 
The authority over the police and the police tasks defined in the 
1993 Police Act will not change. A large alteration is that the 25 
police forces and the National Police Services Agency are no 
longer autonomously managed, but will be part of one public 
corporation, i.e. one national police organization. This organiza-
tion will consist of a management board, 25 regional police 
forces and the National Police Services Agency as national police 
force. The cabinet appointed management board does the man-
agement and administration of the police, within the policy 
framework of the two ministers. The police chiefs are mandated 
to perform the daily management. In this format there are no 
force managers anymore. 
Since local anchoring of the police is still one the fundaments 
of the police, the authority over the police will remain with the 
mayor and the Public Prosecutor. The mayor remains responsible 
for the maintenance of public order or the rendering of assis-
tance, and the Public Prosecutor remains responsible for enforc-
ing the criminal law.  
The local tripartite consultation will remain. At regional level 
a regional police administration will be formed that will consist 
of the mayors in the region and the Chief Public Prosecutor. 
These changes should lead to a better unity in management 
and police task performance and a better balance between local, 
regional and national police tasks. This would make the police 
perform more efficiently and effectively, resulting in higher qual-
ity police care. It should also lead to a better democratic embed-
ded police organization. 
Political dynamics 
While the debate about the new Police Act was intensifying, the 
Balkenende II coalition unexpectedly collapsed. This made it im-
possible for parliament to pass the Act. After the elections the 
new interim Balkenende III coalition stated that she will carefully 
handle the proposed changes since these didn’t get enough sup-
port. 
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In the Balkenende IV coalition the new Police Act was a topic 
that created furious discussions. The Christian Democratic Party 
(CDA) was in favor of a national police, while the Dutch Labor 
Party (PvdA) and the Christian Union (ChristenUnie) were 
against. In the coalition agreement the treatment of the proposal 
was adjourned. According to the new Cabinet the long lasting 
debate about the national police has had positive impact on the 
collaboration between the different police forces. However, be-
fore the end of 2008 the collaboration had to improve – one 
computer network, specializations should be better coordinated, 
material must be bought centrally – otherwise the national police 
would still be implemented. The original 2006 Police Act (now 
200X) functioned as a booster to improve the collaboration. This 
also formed the motive for developing the aforementioned ser-
vice for cooperation of the Dutch Police (vtsPN) 
According to the cabinet some elements required immediate 
attention and two minor adjustments were proposed and accepted 
by the Lower and Higher Chambers. The adjustments to the 1993 
Police Act reduced the autonomy of the regional forces and 
enlarged the authority of the two police ministers, and the Cabi-
net can at least once in four years enforce national priorities to 
the regional forces. Also Interior now has the power to appoint, 
suspend or fire the force manager by royal decree. That is, the 
force manager is not any longer by definition the mayor of the 
largest municipality. 
Recent developments 
The Balkenende IV coalition has given an extra boost to the im-
provement of safety for the coalition period of 2007-2011. In the 
coalition agreement the focus was on enhancing the collaboration 
and the collective functioning of the police forces. Agreements 
were made about ICT, specialization of the forces and a joint pol-
icy on material, personnel and management. 
Recent developments and ‘successes’ made the police minis-
ters decide on December 19 2008 that the adjourned proposal to 
form one national police organization could be withdrawn. The 
core of the 1993 Police Act remains the same and only certain 
preconditions are to be changed. In these plans the regional sys-
tem remains, as well as the authority, administration and steering 
of the regional forces. Most of the supporting administrative 
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tasks of the police will be centralized, however, which should 
lead to an improved efficiency.  
A major change is that the position of the (national) Board of 
Regional Police Force Managers is being strengthened and for-
malized. The Board, which will be chaired by an independent 
chairman, makes agreements about the national priorities with 
the police ministers and also decides about the common policy of 
the tasks and management of the police. The chairman is ap-
pointed by the police ministers after consultation with the board. 
The (national) Council of Police Chiefs will support the Board 
and will also be formalized. The Board of Regional Police Force 
Managers together with the Board of Chief Public Prosecutors 
will discuss issues of interregional collaboration, with the police 
ministers. The steering of the ministers will move away from in-
put (e.g. staffing) to output, i.e. quality and results of the police 
functioning. A national service will emerge that will consist of 
three parts: the concern staff, the service operational management 
and the Police academy. If needed to be more efficient the re-
gional operational management tasks can be brought together in 
the national service (Muller 2009: 3-5).  
Accountability  
All in all at the moment many decisions relating to the manage-
ment and control of the police are taken in an informal way. This 
has the advantage that decisions are quickly made and that they 
are widely supported. Disadvantage is that they are hard to con-
trol. “Force managers realize that giving all the parties involved 
ample scope for consultation is the best way of arriving at suc-
cessful police policy” (Muller 2002: 255). This does make the 
decision-making hard to reconstruct. As all the different parties 
have had the opportunity to express their wishes a great majority 
of the regional council supports the decisions. However, this cre-
ates the problem that practically no mayor has the opportunity to 
influence the decisions. When it comes to management of the 
police forces the mayors should be held accountable to the mu-
nicipal council, but these councils only discuss the way the 
mayor exercises his/her authority in maintaining public order. 
“The fact that in a few cases ‘authority’ is confused with ‘man-
agement’ is take for granted by both the mayor and the council” 
(Muller 2002: 256). 
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5 Assessment of the Dutch police reform 
Changes in the formal structure of the Dutch police system have 
been scarce and rather small since 1993. That could give the im-
pression that all changes within the Dutch system of policing 
were rather scarce and unimportant during the last two decades. 
Such an impression would be false however. Within the confines 
of the formal system of the Dutch police a lot of change oc-
curred. Many of those changes had tremendous impact on the 
functioning of the Dutch police system and on policing. The con-
tinuous debate about the police system was one of the important 
triggers for change. In this section we explore and analyze the 
changes that took place in and within the police system and the 
impact they actually had on the functioning of the Dutch police 
system. 
Main trend: centralization 
The Dutch police system always has been a strongly decentral-
ized one. Even the national police force that covered the rural 
areas until the 1994 reform was strongly decentralized in seven-
teen rather autonomous districts and many local units. In the po-
lice reform debate worries about a strong central police system 
have never been far away.  
A strong national police force, like the Gendarmerie in France 
or the Carabinieri in Italy, is thought to be in conflict with the 
Dutch tradition of pillarization, pacification and consensus seek-
ing (Lijphart 1966). Dutch policing is seen as a very broad and 
multifaceted function. 
The 1994 police reform was a significant deviation from the 
decentralization principle that dominated until then. 148 Munici-
pal police forces and 17 districts of the national police force were 
merged into 25 police regions that were both considerably larger 
than earlier forces and far more distant from local authorities. 
These authorities retained steering power over the police force, 
together with the public prosecutor. Nevertheless, the Dutch po-
lice system was still decentralized in 1994. The division of labor 
between the police regions and the National Police Services 
Agency was still based on the principle ‘decentralized, unless… 
‘, and a national police force was not seen as a feasible option. 
The influence of the minister of Interior remained limited to de-
cisions on management matters, like personnel and finance. At 
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the local level the mayor and the public prosecutor still directed 
the police forces, i.e. they decided what the local police were to 
do (steering, policy). This strict separation between management 
and authority, and the separate steering of them, is a unique char-
acteristic of the Dutch system of policing. There has always been 
a strict separation on a formal level, but in the everyday reality of 
policing what the police (can) do is obviously strongly dependent 
on management matters like the number of personnel and the 
amount of money that is available nationally and how it is dis-
tributed over the police regions and the National Police Services 
Agency.  
Since 1994 the Dutch Police Act has not changed fundamen-
tally. Incremental change occurred, but this did not essentially 
alter the principle of regional police forces and a (mainly) sup-
portive National Police Services Agency. However, central steer-
ing by the minister of Interior is rather strong nowadays. The in-
troduction of one national police force, i.e. the Police Act 200X, 
has only just been avoided and the Balkenende IV cabinet is 
about to introduce a new Police Act that will certainly strengthen 
central influence and steering (Muller 2009). 
During the eighties the Dutch Home Office almost unnoticed 
changed the direction of its management and steering efforts. In 
two pivotal policy papers (Integraal Veiligheidsprogramma 1999; 
Beleidsplan Nederlandse Politie 1998) the minister of Interior 
broadened the focus of its steering efforts - and that of the Justice 
Department – to include the content of regional and local police 
work as well. Until then national decision-making about what the 
police should do was very unusual, due to the strict separation 
between authority and management. Most surprising was that the 
introduction of national steering of police activities hardly met 
any serious societal or political resistance. It might be that only a 
few were aware of the far-reaching implications of this new kind 
of steering. The system of national steering was developing fast 
(see Landelijk Kader Nederlandse Politie 2003) and ultimately 
led to a system of performance management, based on contracts 
between the minister of Interior and the regional forces. The in-
terventions by the minister of Interior, with parliamentary con-
sent, could be characterized as a creeping nationalization and 
centralization. Or, there was “the slow but sure centralization of 
its (i.e. the Dutch police; LC and PM) decentralized structure” 
(Das et al. 2007: 519). 
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An explicit breach with the past was the introduction of the 
National Criminal Investigation Services in 2003. Until then, 
combating serious and organized crime was one of the (many) 
tasks of the regional forces and the National Police Services 
Agency. Due to the complexity and scale of this kind of criminal 
activities, neighboring regions were obligated to cooperate with 
each other within Interregional Investigation Services (IRT’s). 
The IRT’s were replaced by so-called Core teams (Kernteams) 
after a serious scandal about their investigation methods. These 
new teams were also based on cooperation between regional 
forces. The type of crime – and its country of origin – formed the 
basis for a rather strong division of labor and specialization be-
tween the Core Teams. In 1992 the Kok II cabinet decided to 
close down the Core Teams and introduce National Criminal In-
vestigation Services instead. The National Criminal Investigation 
Services has become part of the National Police Services Agency 
and is now numbering about 1000 collaborators. The introduction 
of the National Criminal Investigation Services is a further and 
explicit move towards centralization. Possibly due to the ever-
increasing fear of (serious) crime and the also ever increasing 
discontent about police results this centralization also met little 
resistance. The introduction of a National Criminal Investigation 
Services also shows the ample room the Police Act 1993 offers to 
organize police activities in alternative ways. Some alternatives 
do not alter the balance between direction (central steering) and 
discretion (local freedom to act).  Other alternatives however – 
like the introduction of the National Criminal Investigation Ser-
vices – alter that balance drastically. 
A broader general influence on the police is the introduction of 
modern steering instruments from New Public Management 
(NPM), especially performance contracts. In an attempt to im-
plement more central steering the minister of Interior made per-
formance contracts with the regional police forces. Van Sluis et 
al. (2008) showed that performance contracts had positive effects 
and avoided many perverse effects (Van Sluis and Van Thiel 
2003). Introducing NPM steering did significantly contribute to 
an increase in central steering of the regional police forces even 
though it did not change the police system itself. 
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Trend: an increase in the total amount of steering 
National steering of the police in the Netherlands has increased 
in the past decades (Cachet, et al. 2009). However, this national 
steering did not increase at the expense of decentralized and es-
pecially local steering of the police. Power and influence do not 
necessarily have the characteristics of a zero-sum game. It is also 
possible for the total amount of power and influence to increase 
(Tannenbaum 1968). National steering of the Dutch police be-
came stronger, but so did local steering. However, national steer-
ing of the Dutch police gained relatively more compared to local 
steering, i.e. direction won over discretion. National steering has 
become normal, while in the past the national government lim-
ited its interventions to management only.  
Tensions between local and supra local steering are also miti-
gated by congruence. Till today national and local priorities have 
seldom been really competitive or conflicting. National priorities 
are deduced from local police information, and the national gov-
ernment is trying to facilitate the local government’s fight against 
safety problems. Local steering – utilizing discretionary room on 
the local level – has become a lot more serious and professional, 
e.g. local policy plans, monitoring of results, regional coordina-
tion of local policy formation and execution.  
Theoretically in the future a serious clash between local priori-
ties, like petty crime and disorderly behavior, and national priori-
ties, like organized crime or drugs trafficking, remains possible 
however.   
A lot of incremental and gradual change took place within the 
margins of the 1993 Police Act. The Dutch police are very prone 
to accept new fashions in management and steering (Braga and 
Weisburd 2006). Some of these innovative ways of steering and 
acting are specific for the police, like community policing or in-
formation led policing, while others reflect more general trends 
and fashions in public administration. Within the margins of the 
1993 Police Act police forces kept innovating and changing their 
organizations and the police work itself. The most important 
change was the introduction of area-bound policing (‘gebiedsge-
bonden politiewerk’) in almost all regions (Beumer 1997), which 
is the Dutch version of community policing.  The introduction of 
area-bound policing is an attempt to close the gap between re-
gional police forces and local communities. The introduction of 
community policing can be seen as an attempt to restore the bal-
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ance on the regional level between centralizing tendencies (espe-
cially a drastic increase in scale of the police forces) and decen-
tralizing tendencies (especially strengthening bonds with local 
communities). 
Trend: centralizing and decentralizing tendencies. Towards a 
new equilibrium? 
Since the reorganization direction has gained momentum. There 
has been a strong tendency towards more steering and especially 
towards more central steering. But the trend towards more central 
steering is mitigated by another trend: the trend towards more 
local steering. Local government has become aware it must share 
the burden of fighting crime and disorder with the police, with 
the public prosecutor and the courts of law and with many socie-
tal organizations and citizens. Until now national steering of the 
police is rather schematically, leaving the authorities on the local 
level enough discretion to direct their own course within the 
broad boundaries of the central government’s policies.  
The trend towards more direction by the minister of Interior 
can also be seen as a response to the drastically increased auton-
omy of the police forces. Before the reorganization support be-
tween the rather small police forces was frequently needed and 
became a crucial problem. After the reorganization the larger re-
gional forces could cope with far more problems without asking 
support from adjoining forces. However, an unexpected effect 
was a rather fast increasing autonomy of separate forces. Coop-
eration and mutual support between strong and independent re-
gional forces, though less frequently needed than in the past, be-
came a problem in itself, triggering interventions by national 
government. 
The performance crisis around 2000, the terrorist attacks in 
New York, London and Madrid and the murders of politician 
Pim Fortuyn and writer Theo van Gogh fuelled a strong demand 
for more effective as well as more repressive police work.  Das, 
et al (2007) assert that the ‘soul’ of Dutch policing has changed 
drastically during the past decade. “Dutch policing and justice 
apparatus has traditionally been associated with pragmatism, tol-
erance and a systematic distaste for ‘anything which smacks of 
militarism’ “(519). But nowadays: “(t)he Netherlands seems to 
drift toward the opposite side of the previously progressive ideal” 
(ibidem). In a less tolerant and more repressive climate – see also 
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the fast rise of a right-wing anti Islam party as Geert Wilders’ 
PVV –the police are pressured to be more effective in traditional 
core tasks (kerntaken), like repression and enforcement.  
In many police regions debates about the core tasks have oc-
curred.  Many police forces were ordered to leave softer and 
more preventive functions to others and to concentrate their ef-
forts on more repressive tasks. The withdrawal of the police from 
many preventive activities triggered the further development of 
local safety policy in many communities. 
The murder of Theo van Gogh, committed by an at that time 
almost unknown Muslim fanatic, stressed the importance for the 
police of a strong information position at the local and sub local 
levels. Especially the beat officer could provide invaluable and 
otherwise unavailable information about shifts in opinion, radi-
calizing tendencies et cetera on his beat. In the fight against ter-
ror even the National Criminal Investigation Services or the Na-
tional Intelligence Service (AIVD) would be heavily dependent 
on the kind of information from the societal capillaries. Here cen-
tralizing and decentralizing tendencies come together again. 
6 Conclusions 
The Dutch police system was a much debated but hardly ever 
changing system during the first post World War decades. Since 
the beginning of the 90’s the even more debated system has 
changed, sometimes drastically but most of the time incremen-
tally. Notwithstanding much debate and some successful at-
tempts at change, many characteristics of the police system re-
mained the same. For example, the separation of power over the 
police between administration and law enforcement and between 
those responsible for steering and for management, the so-called 
two ‘dualisms’, remain in tact. 
In spite of some unique characteristics– like the dualisms - 
many characteristics and developments of the Dutch police sys-
tem seem to find their basis in more general Western-European 
developments. In the Netherlands safety concerns led to fierce 
criticism of the police effectiveness; the societal police function 
is less than in the past a governmental monopoly and national 
and local governments fight with each other for (more) control 
over the public police. The politicization of the police has led to 
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disempowerment of the police, i.e. loss of autonomy, as well as 
to empowerment, i.e. more discretion and embeddedness at the 
local level (Savage 2007). 
The police ministers have strengthened their control of the 
Dutch police; thus directing the police more. The 1994 Dutch 
police reform was a shift towards a more centralized and distant 
kind of policing. However, the most significant shift towards 
more, and more centralized, (national) control of the police was 
not brought about by the 1994 system change, but by shifts 
within the then existing police system. Incremental change to-
wards more central steering by the minister of Interior had a tre-
mendous impact on Dutch policing. It went almost unnoticed and 
with a minimum of opposition, but it did change the soul of 
Dutch policing fundamentally (Das, et al. 2007). 
Recent trends in the control of law and order on the local 
level are characterized by sharing and networking between the 
police and many other actors. Police work at the local level has 
become part of a much broader approach to problems of disorder 
or insecurity. The gradual development of integrated local safety 
policies in many cities has led to a redistribution of tasks between 
police, local government and many other actors. It has also led to 
more embedded local police work, i.e. community policing.  
Police forces are now closely cooperating with other actors in 
safety networks (Terpstra and Kouwenhoven 2004), steered by 
local government and concentrating on their core tasks, leaving 
more tasks to other actors than in the past. 
Real and perceived safety problems have obtained a much 
more prominent place on public and political agendas. As long as 
they stay prominent on these agendas there will be debate about 
steering, managing and functioning of the police. Whether that 
debate focuses on system change or change within the existing 
police system seems to be of lesser importance. What really mat-
ters is how any change whatsoever will do justice to the variety 
and diversity of the police function. After all, the police function 
extends ‘from the beat unto the world’ (‘van wijk tot wereld” 
SMVP 2005). Finding sensible balances between centrally organ-
ized tasks and kinds of steering (direction), and more local or-
ganization and steering (discretion) will be crucial for the future 
of the public police. 
In the Netherlands a new round in the ongoing debate about 
policing and the police system is about to begin. In the fall or 
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winter of 2009 the current Dutch cabinet will present its final 
proposals for changing the 1993 Police Act. That will provide us 
with an ‘in vivo’ experiment to see whether it is still possible in a 
highly politicized law and order climate to find a sensible bal-
ance between centralizing and decentralizing tendencies. 
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